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These differences have profound effects upon the standard of disclosure required and upon a party's ability to seek relief. These causes of action differ in their elements, prescriptive and peremptive periods, remedies, and defenses. Additionally, the duty to inform may be enforced through Louisiana's unfair competition law, as well as federal statutes and regulations such as SEC rules 14a-9 and 10b-5 and FTC franchise disclosure provisions. These include: 1) contractual fraud 2) delictual fraud 3) negligent misrepresentation 4) detrimental reliance (delictual and quasi-contractual) 5) redhibition 6) breach of contract 7) breach of warranty 8) error 9) lesion 10) breach of a fiduciary duty and 11) breach of the duty of good faith. Louisiana recognizes at least eleven actions which can be used to seek compensation for a breach of the duty to inform in the confection of a contract. None of these solutions, however, is specifically tailored to the peculiarities of the duty-to-inform problem, and none of them respond directly to a philosophical model. Neither civil- nor common-law jurisdictions use one single theory, rule, or cause of action to address situations in which one party to a contract believes that the other party has, through misrepresentations or omissions, breached its “duty to inform.” Instead, most American jurisdictions enforce the duty to inform through a variety of actions. Exercising due care is especially important because courts may impose delictual liability for withholding information, even when the other party is equally able to discover the information. The best way to avoid liability is to exercise due care when furnishing information, to ensure the accuracy of the information, and to err on the side of disclosure rather than concealment. In drafting and negotiating these agreements, parties need to take steps to avoid the risks associated with breaching the duty to inform. Today, the issue is a practical one that regularly affects parties to sales, leases, insurance contracts, franchise agreements, and numerous other contracts. The “duty to inform” question has confronted commercial societies since the Roman era. Should Mansueto have given the Watermeiers this information? The facts of Watermeier raise the broader question of whether parties to a contract should have a duty to voluntarily disclose information or, when they do voluntarily disclose information, whether they have a duty to disclose correct information. The court denied relief, finding that the plaintiffs' losses were not caused directly by the defendant's conveyance of the misleading information. They brought an action for fraudulent misrepresentation against the vendor.

After the Watermeiers purchased the store, sales were far below the estimates, and consequently, the Watermeiers were soon forced out of business. The tax returns revealed that past sales were significantly lower than the data shown to them before the sale.

Shortly after purchasing the business, the Watermeiers discovered the store's state sales tax returns for the two prior years. Mansueto and his real estate agent, however, persuaded them that these precautionary measures were unnecessary, and the Watermeiers purchased the store. They also asked to spend several hours observing the business. The Watermeiers requested to see the vendor's tax returns in order to confirm the store's financial stability. Mansueto provided the Watermeiers with a number of profit and loss statements, which the Watermeiers relied upon in deciding to purchase the store. Watermeier had never owned a business before a real estate agent suggested that they purchase a retail liquor store from a Mr.